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1. Rousseau and Contemporary Group 
Decision Theory 
1.1 Rousseau’s Social Contract asks how individuals can 
live together without losing their freedom: Is there “a form 
of association which defends and protects with all common 
forces the person and goods of each associate,” Rous-
seau wonders, ”and by means of which each one, while 
uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and 
remains as free as before” (I.6)? Rousseau wrote at the 
dawn of a golden age of reflection on group rationality. The 
last 50 years also witnessed a dramatic increase in 
understanding of formal aspects of group rationality. Yet 
curiously, we understand the mathematics of social choice 
better than its philosophy. But first let me continue with 
Rousseau for a bit.  
Rousseau’s solution to his puzzle is “an act of associa-
tion” that “produces a moral and collective body composed 
of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, 
which receives from this same act its unity, its common 
self, its life and its will” (I.6). As I understand Rousseau, 
this common self belongs to each individual, but is also 
associated with the political community in the same way in 
which selves are associated with persons. So Rousseau’s 
problem admits of a solution if that self is each individual’s 
true self. For then each true self is identical to the self that 
belongs to the body politic. The general will of the 
community, then, is the will associated with this common 
self in the same way in which wills are associated with 
individual selves. Therefore, whatever the community does 
in accordance with the general will expresses the will of 
each true self, and so is binding on each individual while 
leaving him free. To complete the answer, we must show 
that the general will is constructed from individual beliefs 
and values by a process rendering it the will associated 
with each individual’s true self. To this end, I interpret the 
general will as the decisions made by the community with 
its deliberation subject to suitable constraints.  
However, even constrained deliberation is not guaran-
teed to reach unanimity. Decisions must often be made 
under circumstances of radical and persistent disagree-
ment; conflicts of values that cannot be realized in single 
lives, single decisions of deliberating bodies, or single 
constitutions require decisions in spite of irresolvable 
disagreement. So we need an account of what to do when 
deliberation ends inconclusively. We might then still reach 
a general will, provided that for any set of circumstances 
under which a group might find itself in disagreement there 
is a uniquely reasonable rule which delivers that will. So 
we need to investigate the following thesis:  
Uniqueness: for any given set of circumstances, there is 
a uniquely reasonable decision rule the group should 
adopt if deliberation fails to deliver a decision.  
If Uniqueness fails, there will be multiple inconsistent but 
reasonable methods under the same conditions: some will 
“lose” because one method was adopted, though they may 
have “won” had another, equally reasonable, rule been 
used. I argue that Uniqueness is false. Frequently, we 
cannot know the general will if deliberation ends inconclu-
sively, and may also not have any reason to think that 
there actually is a general will in such situations.  
1.2 We are now in the midst of contemporary group 
decision theory. Group decision theory constitutes no 
unified field. Instead, there are separate literatures on 
areas like fair division, game-theoretic scenarios, and 
types of aggregation: aggregation of preference rankings, 
expected utilities with shared probability functions, and, 
recently, Bayesian aggregation of utilities and subjective 
probabilities. My concern is with aggregation. 
Thinking about aggregation leads to puzzles. Suppose a 
department must make a hiring decision. All members rank 
the candidates. How should they determine a group 
ranking? One way of doing so is by aggregating ordinal 
rankings, using proposals to be discussed in section 2. But 
suppose somebody suggests a 100-point system: each 
voter assigns from 0 to 100 points to each applicant, and 
then they average. This proposal uses more than ordinal 
information. Should we adopt this rule instead? Can we 
distinguish conditions under which ordinal rankings are 
appropriate from conditions under which other rankings 
are? Such questions are hard to answer and call for a 
theory that assesses, first, the conditions under which 
particular kinds of rankings are appropriate (e.g., ordinal or 
point systems); second, what specific rule(s) is (are) 
appropriate for the specific kinds of rankings; and third, 
what the criteria for “appropriateness” are, respectively. 
While we do not possess any such theory, I use this 
framework to refute Uniqueness. Section 2 argues that 
Uniqueness is false if we aggregate ordinal rankings, and 
section 3 argues this for Bayesian aggregation. Or, to put 
the claim in terms from the 18th century, we have no 
particular reason to think there is a general will unless 
deliberation ends with unanimity.1  
2. Preference Aggregation: Borda vs. 
Condorcet 
2.1 Suppose we must rank m candidates. The Condorcet 
proposal does so by looking at all m(m-1)/2 pairs among m 
candidates, selecting one or more of the m! rankings in 
light of these pariwise votes. We consider all pairwise 
votes as “data” and ask which ranking of the candidates 
these data support best. The Condorcet proposal selects a 
ranking supported by a maximal number of votes in all 
pairwise elections. For each of the m! rankings, we look at 
the m(m-1)/2 pairs of candidates and count the number of 
voters that rank the respective candidates in the same way 
as that pair and thus support the ranking. To illustrate, 
suppose a group of 48 must rank A, B, and C. 10 rank 
them (A, B, C), 12 (A, C, B), 5 (B, A, C), 7 (B, C, A), 3 (C, 
B, A) and 11 (C, A, B). So here we have 3! = 6 rankings 
and 3(3-1)/2 = 3 pairwise votes. The ranking with the 
highest support in pairwise elections is (A, C, B): In A vs. 
B, 33 people support it (33 people rank A over B), in B vs. 
C 26 people, and in A vs. C 27. Thus 86 votes support (A, 
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 Due to the length constraints, the argument in this paper is sketchy. Some of 
the arguments can be found at other places as well, although I have never 
brought them together in a unified argument opposing Uniqueness. Section 2 
draws on my “Arrow’s Theorem, Indeterminacy, and Multiplicity Reconsid-
ered,” in Ethics 111 (2001), pp 706-734; similarly, section 3 draws on my 
article “Bayesian Group Agents and Two Modes of Aggregation,” forthcoming 
in Synthese (2003). That article, in turn, draws on joint work with Richard C. 
Jeffrey and Matthias Hild: “Preference Aggregation after Harsanyi,” forthcom-
ing in Social Choice and Welfare (2003).  
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C, B) in pairwise votes, compared to 82 for (A, B, C), 64 for 
(B, A, C), 58 for (B, C, A), 62 for (C, B, A), and 80 for (C, 
A, B). So (A, C, B) is a ranking with maximal support. 
Consider now the Borda count. Again a group must rank 
m candidates. First each person ranks them, assigning 0 
to her last-ranked, 1 to her second to the last ranked, etc., 
until she assigns m-1 to her first ranked. Then a sum over 
these numbers is formed for each candidate, which is that 
candidate’s Borda count. The group ranks the candidates 
by decreasing Borda counts. Suppose we have three 
people (1, 2, 3) and four candidates (A, B, C, D). Person 1 
ranks them (A, B, C, D), 2 (B, C, D, A), 3 (A, B, D, C). The 
social ranking is (B, A, C, D) because A obtains six points, 
B seven, C three and D two. Another characterization of 
the Borda count is that it ranks candidates by their average 
position across rankings. Like the Condorcet proposal, the 
Borda count uses as “input” all m(m-1)/2 pairwise votes. 
But Borda asks about the support for each of the m 
candidates in all rankings, whereas Condorcet asks about 
the support for each of the m! rankings in all pairwise 
elections. 
2.2 How to decide between Condorcet and Borda? On 
earlier occasions I argued for three claims: first, arguments 
for majority rule tend to be limited to the case of two 
candidates; second, generalizations of these arguments 
support the Condorcet proposal, and thus that proposal is 
what we should mean in general by majoritarian decision 
making; and third, none of these arguments is decisive 
against the Borda count. I illustrate this for one claim. One 
argument for majority rule is  
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem: Supposes it makes sense to 
speak of being right or wrong about political decisions. 
Suppose n agents choose between two options; that each 
has a probability of p>½ of being right; and that their 
probabilities are independent of each other (i.e., they make 
up their minds for themselves). Then, as n grows, the 
probability of a majority’s being right approaches 1.  
Formulated like this, the theorem only applies to the 
case of two candidates. However, there is a generaliza-
tion, and this generalization picks out the rankings with 
maximal support. The procedure is to go through all m! 
rankings and calculate the conditional probability of the 
pairwise voting results given that the respective ranking is 
the correct one. The ranking that bestows maximum 
likelihood to the voting result is chosen.2 
According to the theorem, rankings selected by Condor-
cet bestow the highest likelihood on the election result. Yet 
the option ranked highest by Borda is the single option 
that, if the best, bestows highest probability upon the 
voting results, provided the voters’ competence p is close 
to ½. Borda is concerned with ranking options in terms of 
their rightness, and Condorcet with finding the right 
ranking. For values of p close to ½, this difference carries 
over to the epistemic scenario, with Condorcet searching 
for the ranking with maximal likelihood, and Borda ranking 
the options in terms of their maximal likelihood. The Borda 
count has its counterpart to this theorem reflecting this 
difference and regards arguments drawing on it as non-
starters. Other arguments in support of the Condorcet 
proposal fare similarly, and mutatis mutandis for Borda. As 
far as rules for aggregating rankings are concerned, 
Condorcet and Borda are on a par: neither has conclusive 
arguments against the other, whereas both are reasonable 
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rules. Thus we have sketched an argument against 
Uniqueness if we are aggregating ordinal rankings.  
3. Bayesian Aggregation:  
Ex Post vs. Ex Ante 
3.1 Our second task is to show that Uniqueness fails for 
Bayesian aggregation. A Bayesian agent is an agent 
described by theories of expected utility theory that take 
probabilities to be subjective. Suppose we have a group of 
such agents, and suppose they would like for their group 
as such also to be a Bayesian agent. Moreover, they also 
would like for group decisions, and thus for group 
preferences, probabilities, and utilities, to be aggregated 
from the respective individual entities in such a way that at 
least unanimous agreements are preserved.  
Mongin (1995), using the Savage framework, shows that 
Bayesian aggregation satisfying some reasonable 
condition is available only to fairly homogenous groups.3 
Mongin’s result holds in ex ante frameworks, where 
restrictions on group expected utilities are formulated in 
terms of individual expected utilities. A typical ex ante rule 
may include a restriction of the kind “If each individual’s 
expected utility is higher for a than for b, the group should 
rank a higher than b.” Mongin’s result fails in the ex post 
framework, which aggregates probabilities and utilities 
separately. Typical ex post aggregation rules may satisfy 
the restriction “If each individual’s utility for a is higher than 
the utility for b, then the group utility for a should be higher 
than the group utility for b.” A parallel condition for 
probabilities may hold.  
Yet ex post models come with trouble of their own: They 
display a peculiar dependence on the level of detail used 
in describing the decision problem. Suppose a group of 
Bayesians aggregate probabilities and utilities according to 
some ex post rule. Suppose they analyze their situation in 
more detail without anybody changing her mind about the 
ranking of the actions. Then the group as a whole should 
not change “its” mind about that ranking when the more 
fine-grained utilities and probabilities are aggregated. 
However, such a reversal may happen under ex post rules. 
So we must choose between two modes of aggregation 
each of which has its problems. 
3.2 On what grounds can we choose? Suppose Ante 
and Post defend those approaches. Both need, first, a 
positive argument for their positions; second, a negative 
argument attacking the opponent’s view; and third, an 
argument why the aforementioned worries about their 
account are not troublesome. Let us sketch these 
positions.  
Ante’s positive argument is that for agents to be taken 
seriously as participants in the decision process means 
being accepted as decision makers, rather than probability 
and utility providers. Agents’ decisions, however, are 
based on preferences, or expectations. Thus restrictions 
on the decision process should be formulated in terms of 
expectations, that is, in the ex ante fashion. Ante’s 
complaint against Post is that the instability result shows 
that the ex post approach is futile. Since we never know 
for sure whether a more fine-grained look at the same 
situation would reverse group preferences, decisions 
based on the ex post approach are ill-founded. As far as 
Mongin’s theorem is concerned, Ante may bite the bullet 
by saying that Mongin’s theorems teach us a lesson about 
                                                     
3
 Philippe Mongin, “Consistent Bayesian Aggregation.” Journal of Economic 
Theory (1995); 66, 313-351 
The General Will, Group Decision Theory, and Indeterminacy - Mathias Risse 
 
 
 297
group decision making. Aristotle was right when, in the 
Politics, he thought of a political community as a commu-
nity of like-minded persons. Rational decision making is 
unavailable to groups with little in common.  
Post proceeds as follows: It is in accordance with the 
Bayesian credo to distinguish facts from values. If the 
group is the decision maker, its method must be to 
aggregate probabilities and utilities separately. Agents are 
taken seriously if their epistemic views and their values are 
taken seriously. This view takes account of the reality of 
the decision structure while assigning individuals the 
appropriate place as members of the group within that 
structure. Post’s complaint against Ante is based on 
Mongin’s theorem. Post thinks of this result as a reductio 
of the ex ante approach. For rational social choice cannot 
be restricted to homogeneous groups, leaving inhomoge-
neous groups without any advice. Post has two replies to 
the instability result: On the one hand, he may deny its 
relevance and argue that in all decision situations that we 
encounter in our lives, even in strongly idealized ones, 
there will be a point when we have reached the most fine-
grained relevant refinement (or at least, the most fine-
grained refinement we are capable of considering). 
Though it is hard to discuss this any further at the general 
level, Post might continue, it will be clear enough in each 
given scenario. On the other hand, it is also open to Post 
to bite the bullet and argue that groups are fragile decision 
makers, but that this insight, far from refuting the ex post 
approach, teaches us something about the nature of 
groups as decision makers. While, once again, this 
argument is sketchy, I claim that neither position has 
resources to refute the other. This establishes the falsity of 
Uniqueness of Bayesian aggregation.  
4. Conclusion 
Rousseau’s general will, I suggested, should be under-
stood as the decisions of the respective group if its 
deliberation is subject to suitable constraints. Since even 
such deliberation cannot ensure unanimity, we must ask 
how a group should reach a decision if deliberation ends 
inconclusively. In many cases, aggregation of individual 
views is needed. For us to have access to the general will, 
there would have to be a unique aggregation rule under all 
conditions under which aggregation is required. I have 
argued for two kinds of settings that there is no such 
uniqueness: there is no uniquely reasonable decision rule 
if ordinal rankings are aggregated, and there is no uniquely 
reasonable rule if both utilities and subjective probability 
are aggregated. Thus in many cases some individuals will 
be “losers” in the decision process although they would not 
have been if had another, equally reasonable rule been 
adopted. This, I claim, is an inescapable feature of group 
decision making.
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 Prepared for a special session on the work of Richard Jeffrey during the 26th 
International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg (Austria), August 3-9, 
2003. My assignment is to address Jeffrey’s group decision theory. He did not 
work much on those areas. Around 1970, Jeffrey worked on a book tentatively 
called “The New Utilitarianism,” but later abandoned the project. The result 
were two papers on interpersonal comparisons of utility, reprinted in The Art of 
Judgment, a collection of his papers. He returned to group decision theory 
towards the end of his life, mostly in joint work with Matthias Hild and myself 
about the epistemic foundations of game theory and Bayesian aggregation. 
My concern in this paper is to put our work on Bayesian aggregation into the 
context of a larger question about group rationality.  
